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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
N.Y. CoNST. art. I, § 6
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions ....
U.S. CONST. amend. WI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. LoPizzo 741
(decided May 13, 1991)
The defendant, Salvatore LoPizzo, appealed his conviction of
attempted robbery in the first degree upon his guilty plea, on the
ground that he was denied his constitutional742 right to counsel at
the line-up in which he was identified. The court held that defen-
dant was, in fact, denied his right to counsel and reversed the
conviction. 743
Prior to the line-up, LoPizzo informed police that he was rep-
resented by counsel and requested counsel's presence at the line-
up. Counsel subsequently informed police, over the telephone,
that he was out of town, would be unable to attend, and requested
a one day delay so that he could be present. The police refused to
wait an additional day, proceeded with the line-up, and LoPizzo
741. 570 N.Y.S.2d 307 (2d Dep't 1991).
742. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The court did
not explicitly differentiate between federal and state law, but decided the case
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was identified. 744
The court recognized that "[ilt is well settled that an accused
does not have a right to counsel at investigatory lineups as a
matter of Federal or State constitutional law. " 745 The court cited
the New York Court of Appeals decision in People v.
Hernandez,746 which expressly articulated this rule.74 7 The court
then relied on People v. Hawkins,748 which stated that police
need not delay the line-up to ensure counsel's presence if
delaying the line-up would cause significant inconvenience to the
identifying witnesses, or "would undermine the substantial
advantages of a prompt identification confrontation." 749
However, "there are exceptions to these rules. If a suspect is al-
ready represented by counsel at the time of the line-up, counsel's
presence cannot be excluded from the proceeding. 750 The
LoPizzo court quoted the New York Court of Appeals, which
stated that:
[W]hen the police are aware that a criminal defendant is repre-
sented by counsel and the defendant explicitly requests the assis-
tance of his attorney, the police may not proceed with the lineup
without at least apprising the defendant's lawyer of the situation
and affording him or her an opportunity to appear.
751
It is undisputed that LoPizzo was represented by counsel at the
time of the line-up. Further the LoPizzo court reasoned that since
the line-up took place seven months after the crime, there was no
need for expediency in identification. Also, the court noted that
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. 70 N.Y.2d 833, 517 N.E.2d 1328, 523 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1987).
747. Id. at 835, 517 N.E.2d at 1330, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
748. 55 N.Y.2d 474, 435 N.E.2d 376, 450 N.Y.S.2d 159, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 846 (1982).
749. Id. at 487, 435 N.E.2d at 383, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
750. Id.; see also People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 338, 320 N.E.2d 625,
630, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 889 (1974) ("When an accused, at any stage, before
or after arraignment, to the knowledge of the law enforcement agencies,
already has counsel, his right or access to counsel may not be denied.").
751. LoPizzo, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 308 (quoting People v. Coates, 74 N.Y.2d
244, 249, 543 N.E.2d 440, 442, 544 N.Y.S.2d 992, 994 (1989)).
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there was no indication that a twenty-four hour delay would have
significantly inconvenienced the identifying witness. 752 Based
upon the foregoing and the fact that LoPizzo's decision to plead
guilty may have been influenced by the result of the line-up at
which he was denied the right to counsel, the court reversed
LoPizzo's conviction. 753
On the federal level, the rule is quite clear when applying the
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 754 The right to counsel attatches and cannot be vio-
lated once formal proceedings have begun against the defendant
on the particular matter in question. 755 In Kirby v. Illinois,756 the
United States Supreme Court noted that "while members of the
Court have differed[, in prior cases,] as to the existence of the
right to counsel . . all of those cases have involved points of
time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings . . .. 757 The Court declined to extend the Sixth
Amendment constitutional right to counsel, afforded to a post
indictment pre-trial line-up, 758 to a pre-indictment police station
show up that had occured before any formal proceedings had
commenced. The Court reasoned that:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere
formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adver-
sary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has
committed itself to prosecute, and only then the adverse posi-
tions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that
a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive
752. Id.
753. Id. at 309.
754. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
755. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (stating that the
sixth amendment right to counsel attaches "at or after the time that judicial
proceeding have been initiated against him . . ... "); Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (listing the types of adversarial judicial criminal
proceedings as "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment.").
756. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
757. Id. at 689 (citations omitted).
758. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
960 [Vol 8
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and procedural criminal law.
759
The fact that an attorney had not yet been retained by defendant
was inapposite because the Court concluded that the right to have
an attorney present does not attach until formal proceedings have
commenced.
Further, in Moran v. Burbine,760 the Supreme Court rejected
defendant's argument that "the Sixth Amendment protects the
integrity of the attorney-client relationship regardless of whether
the prosecution has in fact commenced 'by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraign-
ment.' 7 6 1 The fact that defendant was represented by counsel on
the charge for which he was being held, did not mean that he
could not be interrogated on another wholly unrelated matter for
which formal proceedings had not yet commenced.
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches only after the initiation of formal charges, at which point
the government shifts its role from "investigation to
accusation." 7 62 Moreover, the Court wrote:
More importantly, the suggestion that the existence of an attor-
ney-client relationship itself triggers the protections of the Sixth
Amendment misconceives the underlying purposes of the right to
counsel. The Sixth Amendment's intended function is not to
wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client relationship
for its own sake any more than it is to protect a suspect from the
consequences of his own candor. Its purpose, rather, is to assure
that in any "criminal prosecution" . . . the accused shall not be
left to his own devices in facing the "prosecutorial forces of or-
ganized society. '"763
Thus, a defendant does not have the right to counsel at investi-
gatory line-ups under either the state or federal constitutions
without the presence of other factors. The New York rule turns
759. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
760. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
761. Id. at 428-29 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188
(1984)).
762. Id. at 430.
763. Id. (citations omitted).
1992]
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upon whether the defendant has retained counsel for the matter in
question, while the federal rule turns upon whether formal pro-
ceedings have commenced against the defendant for the particular




(decided January 25, 1991)
The defendant, Judith Goldfinger, sought to suppress secretly
tape recorded statements made by her to an agent of the New
York County District Attorney. Goldfinger claimed that her New
York State constitutional right to counsel765 was violated because
the statements were obtained out of the presence of her attorney
who she had previously retained to defend her in federal civil
proceedings, the subject matter of which was based upon the
same transactions and occurences as the matter being investigated
by the district attorney's office. She claimed that this
constitutional violation should result in the suppression of her
tape recorded statements. The court held that her statements
should be suppressed because, although no formal criminal pro-
ceedings had yet begun, her retention of counsel related to all
matters concerning the transactions and occurences in question
and, therefore, she could not be questioned about them out of the
presence of her attorney. 766
In 1988, Goldfinger's employer, Cosmos Forms Ltd.
(Cosmos), filed a federal civil suit under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)7 67 against
Guardian Life Insurance Co. (Guardian), one of its corporate
764. 149 Misc. 2d 765, 565 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1991).
765. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
766. Goidfinger, 149 Misc. 2d at 771, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
767. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (Supp. 1990).
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